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I. What Is an Arrest
"Actual contact is not necessary to constitute arrest...."' This
statement from an early case is the only Virginia authority on the
technical elements of an arrest. Consequently, the law of arrest as it
exists in Virginia, with a few statutory exceptions, is as generally un-
derstood at common law.2 A legal encyclopedia gives the following
definition.
"An arrest is the taking, seizing, or detaining of the person
of another, either by touching or putting hands on him, or by
any act which indicates an intention to take him into custody
and subjects the person arrested to the actual control and will
of the person making the arrest. The act relied upon as constitut-
ing an arrest must have been performed with the intent to effect
an arrest and must have been so understood by the party arrest-
'Womack v. Circle, 2 Va. L.J. 2o9, 219 (1878).
2See Va. Code Ann. § 1-io (1950); Muscoe v. Commonwealth, 86 Va. 443, io
S. F. 534 (i8go); and Galliher v. Commonwealth, 161 Va. 1014, 17o S.E. 734 (1933).
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ed. Also, the person making the arrest must be acting under
some real or pretended legal authority for taking the person
into custody. It is not necessary, however, that there be an ap-
plication of actual force, or manual touching of the body, or
physical restraint which may be visible to the eye, or a formal
declaration of arrest; it is sufficient if the person arrested under-
stands that he is in the power of the one arresting and sub-
mits in consequence. However, in all cases in which there is no
manual touching or seizure or any resistance, the intentions
of the parties to the transaction are very important; there must
have been intent on the part of one of them to arrest the other,
and intent on the part of such other to submit, under the be-
lief and impression that submission was necessary. There can
be no arrest where the person sought to be arrested is not con-
scious of any restraint of his liberty. But the mere submis-
sion of a person, whether pretended or actual, will not consti-
tute an arrest if he is not at the time actually within the power
of the officer. If an officer having authority to make an arrest
lays his hands upon the person of the prisoner, however slight-
ly, with the intention of taking him into custody, it is an arrest,
even though he may not succeed in stopping or holding him
even for an instant."
3
2. Who may arrest.
Persons authorized to arrest can be grouped in five classes, though
they are not mutually exclusive.
2-1. Officers of the law.
This group includes persons who are regularly employed in gen-
eral enforcement of the laws of the Commonwealth, and are called
"law enforcement officers,". "peace officers," "policemen," or by some
similar term.
2-1.1. State police.
This group comprises state police, police of cities and towns, coun-
ty police and sheriffs, the Capitol police, police officers of state agen-
cies, and police officers of other states.
The authorizing statute provides:
"The superintendent of State Police, his several assistants
and police officers appointed by him are vested with the powers
34 Am. Jur. Arrest § 2 (1936). (Footnotes omitted.) See also 6 C.J.S. Arrest, §
1 (1937), a more detailed account of the technical elements of arrest; i Alexander,
The Law of Arrest, section 45 (1949), a more elaborate and philosophical discussion
of the definition of arrest; 4 Wharton, Criminal Law and Procedure, § 1581 (1957).
a brief definition substantially identical to that in other sources cited.
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of a sheriff for the purpose of enforcing all the criminal laws
of this State, and it shall be the duty of the Superintendent, his
several assistants and police officers appointed by him to use
their best efforts to enforce the same." 4
2-1.2. Police of cities and towns.
The authorizing statute provides:
"The officers and privates constituting the police force of
cities and towns of the Commonwealth are hereby invested
with all the power and authority which formerly belonged to
the office of constable at common law in taking cognizance of,
and in enforcing the criminal laws of the Commonwealth and
the ordinances and regulations of the city or town, respectively,
for which they are appointed or elected." 5
2-1.3. Police of counties.
There is no authorizing statute specially for sheriffs and deputies
of counties. These officers, therefore, presumably have the same au-
thority as police, of cities and towns.6
There are, however, two pertinent statutes: one providing for the
appointment by the county sheriff of a special police force in counties
of population of more than 35,ooo; 7 the other, for a "police depart-
ment and police trial board" in counties of population 42,000 to
45,oo.8 Although there is no explicit statute, police appointed pur-
suant to these statutes presumably have the same authority to arrest
as police of cities and towns.9
For those counties not meeting these population requirements
for an organized police force, provision is made for appointment of
"special policemen":
"The circuit court of any county, or the judge thereof in
vacation, may appoint special policemen for so much of such
county as is not embraced within the incorporated town....,10
These "special policemen" are given power to execute warrants and
apprehend those persons "whom they have cause to suspect have
violated, or intend to violate any law of the State ..
'Va. Code Ann. § 52-8. (ig5o).
'Va. Code Ann. § 15-557 (1950).
6See statute cited supra note 5.
Wa. Code Ann. § 15-574.1 (1950).
Wa. Code Ann. section 15-574.2 (1950).
'See statute cited supra note 5.
"'Va. Code Ann. § 15-562 (1950).
uVa. Code Ann. § 15-57, (950).
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While their authority is generally confined to the county for
which appointed, it extends throughout the state "when actually in
pursuit of persons accused of crime and when acting under authority
of a duly executed warrant .... -1
2
Under the language of cases construing the authority of such of-
ficers, it is plain that they have, within their own jurisdictions, the
same power to arrest as other law enforcement officers have. It is not
clear, though, whether they must have possession of a warrant when
they pursue suspected criminals outside their own bailiwicks. One
case says that there is no limitation upon the power of special police-
men to arrest persons charged with a felony and found within their
territorial jurisdiction, and when actually in pursuit to arrest persons
outside of the counties for which they have been appointed.13
2-1.4. Police officers of state agencies.
General. The officers of several state agencies have authority to
arrest for violations of laws applicable to their particular agency, as the
Commissioner of Game and Inland Fisheries of the Department of
Conservation and Development. Only the law enforcement officers of
the Virginia Alcoholic Beverage Control Board, however, have statu-
tory authority to enforce the general criminal laws of the state, as well
as the laws relating to their agency; the authorizing statute gives them
such power "as is now vested in sheriffs of counties and police of cities
and towns" in enforcing the criminal laws.1 4 Other officers of state
agencies who have authority to arrest are: probation and parole of-
ficers; forest wardens; game wardens; members of the Commission of
Fisheries; and officers of societies for protecting animals.
Probation and parole officers. "Any probation and parole officer
may arrest a parolee without a warrant, or may deputize any other
officer with power of arrest to do so" where the parolee has violated
the conditions of his parole.15
Forest wardens. Forest wardens have the authority and power of a
common law constable and of other "arresting officers under the
statutes of this State," so far as violations of forest fire regulations and
law, or fish and game protection laws.' 6
1nVa. Code Ann. § 15-570 (1950).
'3Villiams v. Commonwealth, 142 Va. 667, 670, 128 S.E. 572, 573 (1925).
I',a. Code Ann. § 4-8 (1950). As to the authority to arrest of sheriffs and police
of cities and towns, see statute cited supra note 5-
'-a. Code Ann. § 53-259 (195o).
'Wa. Code Ann. § 10-55 (195o).
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Game wardens. Game wardens have power to arrest, upon display-
ing badge of office, any person found violating any provisions of hunt-
ing, trapping, inland fish and dog laws.17
Members of the Commission of Fisheries.
"The Commissioner or any member of the Commission of
Fisheries, all inspectors, police captains of boats, and other
employees designated by the Commissioner in the service, shall
have the power, with or without warrant, to arrest any person
or persons found violating any of the fish or shellfish laws....",u
Capital police. Capital police have authority to arrest for offenses
committed on the Capitol Square, the same as policemen of the city
of Richmond may arrest for offenses committed within the jurisdiction
of that city.19
2-1.5. Police of other states.
A policeman from a "peace unit" of another state in close pursuit
of an alleged felon in this state has the same authority to arrest as
police officers of this state, provided the other state extends the same
privilege to this Commonwealth.2 0 There is no authority as to wheth-
er an officer from another state may arrest in this state for a misde-
meanor.
2-2. Conservators of the peace.
The terms "conservator of the peace" and "special policeman" are
used interchangeably and apparently are synonymous, at least inso-
far as indicating authority to arrest. Some statutes declare that special
policemen appointed thereunder have the power to arrest of conserva-
tors of the peace; 2 ' others, that a conservator of the peace appointed
thereunder has the power to arrest of a special policeman.2 2 The dis-
tinction here is based solely upon whichever term is used in the Code,
and upon convenience of classification.
The office of conservator of the peace originated in early common
law. Its purpose is to invest certain persons with quasi-judicial au-
thority to maintain public order; consequently a limited authority to
arrest also is given.
'Wa. Code Ann. § 29-32 (195o).
"Va. Code Ann. section 28.1-185 (Supp. 1962).
"Va. Code Ann. § 2-77 (195o).
"Va. Code Ann. § 19.1-97 (1950).
"Va. Code Ann. § 56-330 (1950).
"Va. Code Ann. § 56-394 (195o).
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The basic statute provides that the circuit, corporation, or hustings
courts may appoint conservators of the peace for certain places such
as colleges, hospitals, penal institutions, etc.2
Other statutes provide that the following persons also shall be con-
servators of the peace; every judge, justice of the peace,24 commission-
er in chancery and county surveyor (while performing the duties of
his office); 2- judges of courts not of record having criminal jurisdiction
and judges of municipal courts; 26 clerks of municipal courts having
criminal jurisdiction and clerks of juvenile courts; 27 the superin-
tendent or person in charge of any fair grounds or public or private
cemetery; 28 the superintendent and resident officers of any hospital
or colony for insane, epileptic, feeble-minded or inebriate persons; 29
masters of steamships or steamboats and wharf or landing agents;3 0
conductors on trains, motormen, station and railroad depot agents;31
conductors and motormen on electric railway cars;32 operators of
motor buses which are common carriers, and bus station and depot
agents.
33
Some conservators of the peace have an authority to arrest as broad
as that of regular law officers; Code section 19.1-2o provides that a con-
servator of the peace who is appointed thereunder "shall arrest without
warrant for felonies committed in his presence, or upon reasonable
suspicion of felony, and for breaches of the peace and all misdemean-
ors of whatever character committed in his presence." Other conser-
vators have authority to arrest limited to particular times34 or places.35
In particular cases, the appropriate Code section must be consulted.
Va. Code Ann. § 19.1-28 (1950).
2'As to arrest by a justice of the peace for felony committed in his presence,
see Randolph v. Commonwealth, 145 Va. 883, 891, 134 S.E. 544, 546 (1926). As to
arrest by a justice of the peace for misdemeanor committed in his presence, see
Muscoe v. Commonwealth, supra note 2, at 449, 1o S.E. at 536.
z-Va. Code Ann. § 19-1-20 (195o).
"3Va. Code Ann. § 16.1-28 (1950).
"Va. Code Ann. §§ 16.1-59, 16.1-146 (1950).
-Va. Code Ann. § 19.1-32 (1950).
-Va. Code Ann. § 37-15 (1950).
3Va. Code Ann. § 56-456 (1950).
aVa. Code Ann. § 56-354 (195o). As applying Va. Code Ann. § 1294 (d) (19o4),
a predecessor statute to section 56-354, see Norfolk & IV. Ry. v. Birchfield, 1o5 Va.
809, 54 S.E. 879 (igo6).
''Va. Code Ann. § 56-394 (195o).
-v'a. Code Ann. § 56-324.1 (195o).
14See Va. Code Ann. § 19.1-2o (195o), providing a county surveyor is a conserva-
tor of the peace while performing the duties of his office.
"See Va. Code Ann. § 56- 456 (195o), providing masters of steamships are con-
servators of the peace, but only on board their respective vessels.
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2-3. Special policemen.
Officers of the law appointed under the various special policemen
statutes generally have the same authority to make arrests as "regular"
policemen, but, as they have been appointed for more restricted pur-
poses, their jurisdiction may be limited to certain places or situations.
The apparent aim of these statutes is to provide for enforcing public
peace or particular laws at times and places where there is a tempora-
ry need beyond what can be met by regular officers.
It is provided that the supervisor or justice of the peace of a mag-
isterial district may appoint temporary police to preserve order at
religious or camp meetings.36 Special police also may be appointed
for colleges, hospitals, and penal institutions, 37 for railroads, 38 and
steamship companies.3 9 The driver, operator, or other person in charge
of a motor vehicle carrying passengers for hire is a special policeman
for the limited purpose of enforcing specified statutes. 40
Except where otherwise specified, special police appointed in one
of the above situations have the same authority to arrest as special
police appointed in counties.41
Any officer or agent of an incorporated society for the prevention
of cruelty to animals may arrest without warrant any person violat-
ing in his presence the provisions of the laws relating to cruelty to
animals.
42
A judge of an election may order the arrest of any person commit-
ting specified offenses at the polls: disturbing an election, intimidat-
ing voters, or carrying away a ballot.43
2-4. Arrest by private persons.
A private person may make a citizen's arrest, as at common law.
When empowered to execute a warrant, a private citizen is clothed
with the authority of a law officer while acting in this capacity.44
'wa. Code Ann. § 19.1-82 (195o).
'Va. Code Ann. § 19.1-28, 19.1-30 (1950).
"Va. Code Ann. § 56-353 (1950). As applying Va. Code Ann. § 3944 (193), a
predecessor statute to section 56-353, See Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Haun, 167 Va. 157,
187 S.E. 481 (1936).
"Wa. Code Ann. § 56-455 (195o).
"0Va. Code Ann. § 56-330 (195o). Applied in New v. Atlantic Greyhound Corp.,
186 Va. 726, 43 S.E.2d 872 (1947).
"Cross-reference: As to power to arrest of special policemen appointed in coun-
ties, see section 2-1.3 supra.
"Va. Code Ann. § 18.1-217 (1950).
"Va. Code Ann. §§ 24-190, 24-192, 24-236 (1950).
"Randolph v. Commonwealth, 145 Va. at 891, 134 S.E. at 546 (1926). Cross-
reference: As to arrest by private persons without warrant, see infra § 9.
ARREST IN VIRGINIA
3. Who is subject to arrest: certain limitations and immunities.
Although all persons are subject to criminal arrest, some, as cer-
tain public officials, have a limited immunity, and others, as minors,
are subject only within prescribed procedural limits.
Members of the United States Congress are immune from arrest
during sessions of their respective houses, except for treason, felony,
and breach of peace.4 5 Members of the Virginia General Assembly 46
and their clerks and assistants4 7 have a similar immunity.
48
There also are limitations on the criminal arrest of members of the
national guard under certain circumstances 49 and out-of-state citizens
summoned here to testify5 0
The most detailed procedural limitations in criminal arrest concern
minors.8 1 Only specified persons may issue, or authorize issuance of,
warrants for minors,52 and a minor may be arrested only under cer-
tain circumstances.5 3 Generally however, an officer may arrest, even
without a warrant, a minor who has committed an offense in his pres-
ence.
As to exact limitations applicable Code sections should be con-
sulted.5
4
II. ARREST UNDER AUTHORITY OF WARRANT
A. The warrant of arrest.
Since the main purpose of a criminal warrant is to apprise the ac-
cused of the offenseA5 one is not necessary when the offense is commit-
ted in the arresting officer's presence,56 though the offense be but a
",U.S. Const. art. I § 6.
"Va. Const. § 48; Va. Code Ann. §§ 30-6, 30-7 (1950).
'Wa. Code Ann. §§ 3o-6, 3o-7 (195o).
"SNeither the Virginia Constitution nor the Code contain any provision con-
ferring immunity from arrest on the Governor and other state officials.
"Ia. Code Ann. § 44-97 (1950).
r"Va. Code Ann. § 19.1-277 (1950).
aVa. Code Ann. §§ 16.a-194, 16.1-195, 16a-197 (95o).
rWa. Code Ann. § 16.1-195 (195o). For construction of the predecessor statute
to section 16.1-195, see Mickens v. Commonwealth, 178 Va. 273, 16 S.E.2d 641
(1941).
'Na. Code Ann. § 16.1-194 (1950).
&See particularly statutes cited supra notes 52, 53-
rWord v. Commonwealth, 30 Va. (3 Leigh) 743, 747; Robinson v. Common-
wealth, s18 Va. 785, 788, 87 S.E. 553, 554 (1916).
"Va. Code. Ann. § 16.1-129.1 (1950). Applied in Gooch v. City of Lynchburg,
2o1 Va. 172, 11o S.E.2d 236 (1959)-
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misdemeanor.57 Nor is a warrant required when accused already is in
custody under an indictment.58
If the offense is a misdemeanor, so as not to require an indictment,
the accused may demand that the charges be reduced to writing in the
form of a warrant.59 But if he does not make such a request the lack of
a warrant is not grounds for reversal on due process grounds.60
4-1. Who may issue warrants.
The basic statute61 provides that any of the following persons may
issue warrants: (i) a judge, in vacation of term, or clerk of any cir-
cuit or corporation court with criminal jurisdiction; (2) a judge or
clerk of any county or municipal court with criminal jurisdiction; (8)
a judge of any juvenile and domestic relations court; (4) any justice of
the peace, unless otherwise provided by law; (5) any police justice;
6 2
(6) any person authorized by statute.
Into this last group fall various persons in official or semi-official
capacities. All have limited authority to issue warrants, though some
are less restricted than others. A judge of a court not of record may,
"within the scope of his general jurisdiction within the area which his
court serves, issue warrants, summons and subpoenas... in civil and
criminal cases... and may also issue fugitive warrants.. ,,63 while
the Parole Board may issue warrants only for the arrest of a parolee
who has violated the terms of his parole.64
The power of the State Corporation Commission to issue war-
rants in arson investigations, 65 and of the superintendent of any hos-
pital for the insane, epileptic, mentally deficient or inebriate (for
arrest of escapees), 66 is similarly limited to specified situations.
Conservators of the peace may issue warrants of arrest upon com-
plaint that there is "good cause" to believe a crime is intended. 67 This
statute appears to have been little used in practice, and it has been ap-
5Gooch v. City of Lynchburg, 2o Va. at 175, 110 S.E.2d at 238.
mWaller & Boggs v. Commonwealth, 84 Va. 492, 5 S.E. 364 (1888).
wVa. Code Ann. § 16.1-129.1 (195o); Gooch v. City of Lynchburg, 201 Va. 56
at 175, 10 S.E.2d at 238.
'0Gooch v. City of Lynchburg, 201 Va. at 175, 1o S.E-ad at 238.
G
1
Va. Code Ann. § 19.1-90 (1950).
62For a definition of "police justice," see Va. Code Ann. § 16.1-70 (1950)-
0Va. Code Ann. § 16.1-27 (1950).
"Va. Code Ann. § 53-258 (195o).
6Va. Code Ann. §§ 27-59, 27-60 (1950).
0"Va. Code Ann. § 37-97 (1950).
EVa. Code Ann. § 19.1-21 (1950).
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plied only in a very early case.0 8 It might be questioned whether the
legislature intended bus drivers or wharf agents, both of whom are
conservators of the peace,6 9 to have authority to issue warrants merely
upon the belief that a crime is to be committed.
The Governor has authority to issue extradition warrants. 70
4-2. Grounds for issuing warrants.
The "probable cause" requirement of the Virginia Constitution,
although phrased differently, 71 is essentially the same as that of the
fourth amendment of the United States Constitution. And while
there are some statutes using other language to express the necessary
basis for issuance of a warrant, all amount to probable cause.
"Probable cause is knowledge of such a state of facts and circum-
stances as to excite the belief in a reasonable mind, acting on such
facts and circumstances, that the ... [accused] is guilty of the crime
of which he is suspected." 72 Probable cause is a question of law for the
court,73 although the existence of facts sufficient to establish it is a
question for the jury.7 4
Statutes not using the term "probable cause" use language sub-
stantially similar in meaning: "good reason to believe an offense has
been committed";7 r "complaint of a respectable citizen";7 6 "affidavit of
a credible person";77 "substantial evidence."78
4-3. Form and contents of warrant.
Besides technical fonnalities, the essentials of a warrant are that
6Vells v. Jackson, 17 Va. (3 Munf.) 458, 460 (81H). (The conservator here was
a justice of the peace.)
®See supra notes 33, 30.
7'Va. Code Ann. § 19.1-56 (1950).
71"That general warrants ... to seize any person ... whose offense is not par-
ticularly described and supported by evidence ... ought not to be granted." Va.
Const. § io. (Emphasis added.)
n'irginia ly. & Power Co. v. Klaff, 123 Va. 260, 266, 96 S.E. 244, 246 (1918).
See also Scot & Boyd v. Shelor, 1 Va. L.J. 539, 548 (1877).
nClinchfield Coal Corp. v. Redd, 123 Va. 42o, 443, 96 S.E. 836, 843 (1918).
7"Womack v. Circle, 2 Va. L.J. at 217.
7bVa. Code Ann. § 19.1-91 (1950), the basic statute governing issuance of crim-
inal warrants.
',Va. Code Ann. § 37-61 (ig5o), providing for arrest of mentally ill, epileptic,
mentally deficient or inebriate persons.
77Va. Code Ann. § 19.1-63 (1950), providing for arrest of persons alleged to
have committed crimes in another state.
7 Va. Code Ann. § 19.-193 (1950), providing for arrest of certain railroad em-
ployees in cases of deaths in train accidents.
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it describes the accused and offense. The person must be described
sufficiently to avoid the prohibition against general warrants; 70 de-
scribing him, e.g., as an "associate" of a named person is not sufficient.80
As to the offense, if set forth in substance and apprising the ac-
cused of the charge, this is adequate. 81 The particularity of an in-
dictment is not required.8 2 For example, unless included in the appli-
cable statute, terms of art such as "feloniously"
8' 3 or "unlawful ' 8 4
may be omitted.
The adequacy of language setting forth the offense is tested by
whether it gives the "accused notice of the charge; such notice as may
be of some use to him; such as may give him an opportunity of de-
fending himself.., no nicety is required.... 8 5
An allegation, in a bootlegging prosecution, that accused "did un-
lawfully sell" is adequate, 86 as is an allegation, not specifying any
statute, that accused violated the "fish and game laws of this State."
87
Nor is it necessary to quash proceedings because there is a difference
of wording among formal papers prepared at various stages of a
suit.88
However, a warrant for alleged violation of the motor vehicle
code, citing "chapter 342, section 35" without further specifying the
applicable body of statutes, is void on its face because vague and
indefinite,8 9 as is one charging violation of "section 86 of Code of
Virginia" when the intended reference is to section 36, chapter 247
of the Acts of 193o.90
Citing the Michie Code has been held sufficient statutory refer-
70Va. Const. § lo; Wells v. Jackson, 17 Va. (3 Munf.) at 473.
80Ibid.
81Word v. Commonwealth, go Va. (3 Leigh) at 747.
8Lacy v. Palmer, 93 Va. 159, 24 S.E. 930, 934 (1896); Jones v. Morris, 97 Va.
43, 48, 33 S.E. 377, 378 (1899); Harding v. Commonwealth, 1o5 Va. 858, 861, 52 S.E.
832, 833 ('9o6); Flint v. Commonwealth, 114 Va. 820, 822, 76 S.E. 308, 309 (1912);
Bissell v. Commonwealth, 199 Va. 397, 399, lOO S.E.2d 1, 3 (1957).
1'Satterfield v. Commonwealth, io5 Va. 867, 870, 52 S.E. 979, 980 (1906).
"'Collins v. City of Radford, 134 Va. 518, 530, 113 S.E. 735, 739 (1922). See also
Burks v. Commonwealth, 126 Va. 763, 0l1 S.E. 230 (1919).
s1Word v. Commonwealth, 30 Va. (3 Leigh) at 747.
'IHarding v. Commonwealth, supra note 82; Flint v. Commonwealth, supra
note 82.
8'Burks v. Commonwealth, supra note 84.
Halkem v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. (2 Va. Cas.) 4 (1815).
8Commonwealth v. Doss, 159 Va. 968, 167 S.E. 371 (1933).
10Smith v. Commonwealth, 16o Va. 943, 169 S.E. 550 (1933). Also as to vague
warrants, see Bissell v. Commonwealth, supra note 82.
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ence,91 although apparently, if the offense is otherwise substantially
alleged, an applicable statute need not be specified. 92
Omission of the time and place of the offense is not a defect re-
quiring reversal on appeal, though a warrant properly should bear
this information.
93
Apparently there is no special form for concluding a warrant, so
that the error of concluding one issued by a city "in behalf of the
Commonwealth" is not fatal.
9 4
More particularly are technical defects not fatal when the objec-
tion is initially raised collaterally 95 or on appeal.96
4-4. Amending the warrant.
Courts' statutory power to amend warrants97 is liberally con-
strued,98 and where an accused does not avail himself of this power,
appellate courts "will not reverse the judgment of the trial court for
formal imperfections of the warrant unless the ends of justice require
it."99
"Dorchincoz v. Commonwealth, 191 Va. 33, 59 S.E.2d 863 (1950).
"2Collins v. City of Radford, supra note 84, at 525, 113 S.E. at 737. See also
Burks v. Commonwealth, supra note 84.
"3 Vord v. Commonwealth, supra note 55, at 759. See also Commonwealth v.
Mfurray, 4 Va. (2 Va. Cas.) 504 (1826)), involving an erroneous date on a warrant of
commitment.
O"Collins v. City of Radford, supra note 84, at 524, 113 S.E. at 737. (Emphasis
added.)
":Jones v. Morris, supra note 82, larceny warrant omitting term "feloniously"
held not subject to attack in subsequent malicious prosecution suit; Lacey v.
Palmer, supra note 82, in habeas corpus proceeding, held proper a warrant aver-
ring in general terms that accused was guilty of all acts named in applicable statute
without charging him with any specific act. See also Jones v. Timberlake, 27 Va.
(6 Rand.) 678 (1828), objection in a habeas corpus proceeding to failure to note
on the face of an escape warrant the issuing officer's title, overruled and held
that warrant sufficient.
uFlint v. Commonwealth, supra note 82, allegation "did unlawfully sell" in
bootlegging prosecution held not so vague as to require overturning judgment
when objection made for first time on appeal; Word v. Commonwealth, supra, note
55, objection to omission in warrant of time and place of offense first made in bill
of exceptions, held, conviction affirmed. See also Burks v. Commonwealth supra
note 84, and Dorchincoz v. Commonwealth, supra note 91.
""Upon the trial of the warrant on appeal the court may, upon its own
motion or upon the request either of the attorney for the prosecution or for
the accused, amend the form of the warrant in any respect in which it appears to
be defective." Va. Code Ann. § 16.1-137 (195o).
" See McWilliams v. Commonwealth, x65 Va. 725, 181 S.E. 391 (1935); Robinson
v. Commonwealth, 111 Va. 844, 69 S.E. 518 (g1o); Flint v. Commonwealth, supra
note 82; Robinson v. Commonwealth, supra note 55.
"Harley v. Commonwealth, 131 Va. 664, 667, io8 S.E. 648, 649 (1921). See also
Flint v. Commonwealth, supra note 82, at 822, 823, 76 S.E. at 3o9, 310.
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A warrant may, for example, be amended: to change the wording
of the offense; 100 to include a previously omitted element of the of-
fense;' 0 ' to make allegedly vague language more specific; 10 2 or to
change the date of the offense.' 0 3 The amending power does not,
however, include substituting into the record for appeal a new warrant
charging violation of a different statute carrying a higher penalty.
10 4
5. Executing the warrant.
5-1. Who may execute a warrant.
Any person to whom a warrant is directed may execute it. And pro-
ceedings thereon are void when it is executed by one other than to
whom directed,105 or by an unauthorized substitute.10 6
One other than the officer to whom a warrant is directed may exe-
cute it if delivered to him for that purpose.107 This includes a private
person, 08 who may summon other private persons to assist him,109
although he may not delegate his authority of execution of the war-
rant to another private person."1
Where a warrant is directed "to any policeman" of a named city
or town, it may be executed by any such officer who gets it."'
5-2. Where warrant may be executed.
When a court in session in a criminal proceeding issues a warrant
for an accused party (or witness), expedition makes it desirable that
authority of execution run state-wide, and the statute so provides."
12
Ordinarily, however,
"Every officer to whom any order, warrant, or process may
be lawfully directed, shall execute the same within his county
'-ORobinson v. Commonwealth, supra note 98. Court allowed language in war-
rant to be changed from "attempt to take, steal and carry away" to "attempt to
obtain money under false pretenses."
"'Byrd v. Commonwealth, 124 Va. 833, 98 S.E. 632 (1919).
102McWilIiams v. Commonwealth, supra note 98.
'03Humphreys v. Commonwealth, i86 Va. 756, 43 S.E.2d 89o (1947).
'"Eddy v. Commonwealth, 119 Va. 873, 89 S.E. 899 (1916).
105Randolph v. Commonwealth, supra note 24, at 892, 134 S.E. at 546.
'0"Wells v. Jackson, supra note 68.
'0Crosswhite v. Barnes, 139 Va. 471, 482, 124 S.E. 242, 245 (1924).
0Randolph v. Commonwealth, 145 Va. at 891, 134 S.E. at 546.
lIbid.
a"Ibid.
"'Va. Code Ann. § 19.1-91 (1950). (Although this statute does not expressly
include police of counties, there seems no reason why a warrant to a county officer
could not be so addressed and so executed.)
2Va. Code Ann. § 19.1-182 (1950).
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or corporation.... The word 'county' as hereinbefore used
shall embrace any city included within the boundaries of such
county, and the word 'corporation' as hereinbefore used shall
embrace all property belonging to the county within the terri-
torial limits of such corporation." 113
The limitation of the officer's authority to "his county" is directory
and not mandatory.114 By virtue of statute the warrant may be exe-
cuted anywhere in the state when an accused flees. 15
The statute delineating the authority of special policemen"16 is
similar:
"The jurisdiction and authority of... [special police] shall
extend no further than the limits of the county in which they
are appointed.... [except that] it shall extend throughout the
State when actually in pursuit of persons accused of crime and
when acting under the authority of a duly executed war-
rant ... "117
Special policemen appointed for railroads" s have state-wide author-
ity to arrest, even without warrant, but only in matters involving the
railroad."19
Authority of execution also may run state-wide in several other
particular situations, viz., warrants for escapees of any hospital or
colony for the insane, epileptic, mentally deficient or inebriate, 20 and
extradition warrants.
2
As to boundary offenses, committed within 300 yards of a county
line, any police officer of either county may arrest within that dis-
tance on either side of the boundary.
22
5-3. Possession of warrant at time of arrest.
The rule seems to be that an officer must possess the warrant when
"Va. Code Ann. § 15-514 (1950). (Emphasis added.)
3'Va. Code Ann. § 15-514 (195o), especially annotation citing Dellastatious v.
Boyce, 152 Va. 368, 147 S.E. 267 (1929), holding that an officer may properly summon
to his assistance in an arrest people of another county than his own.
'If a person charged with an offense shall... escape from.., the county or
corporation in which the offense is alleged to have been committed, the officer to
whom the warrant is directed may pursue and arrest him anywhere in the State.
Va. Code Ann. § 19.1-94 (1950).
u'Cross reference: As to special policemen's authority to arrest, see supra § 2-3.
uWa. Code Ann. § 15-57o (195o).
"'Va. Code Ann. § 56-353 (195o). And see supra note 38.
"'Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Haun, 167 Va. at 162, 187 S.E. at 483.
2mVa. Code Ann. § 37-97 (195o).
"'Va. Code Ann. § 19.1-57 (1950).
1"a. Code Ann. § 19.1-222 (1950).
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arresting for a misdemeanor not committed in his presence, 23 while
arrest for a felony, whether or not committed in the officer's presence,
may be made without his having the warrant with him.
124
There is misleading dicta contra in one case,' 25 but other language
in the same opinion 126 is unambiguously in accord with the general
rule. Besides, the case involved a felony, for which an officer may prop-
erly arrest without having the warrant with him.
5-4. Informing accused.
An accused is entitled to know the charges against him.12 7 This
applies whether the arrest is made under authority of a warrant or
without a warrant.
Where the arrest is under authority of a warrant the process must
be shown on request."-s Refusal may give accused a right to resist. 2 9
A statute pertinent to arrest under authority of warrant provides that
"except as provided in section 46.1-178,10 any process issued against
a person charged with a criminal offense shall be in duplicate and
the officer serving such process shall leave a copy with the person
charged."'31
The purpose of requiring a copy of the warrant to be left with an
accused is to inform him of the charge against him so that he may in-
telligently prepare his defense."32 But, "while it is the duty of the
arresting officer to comply with this statute, his failure to do so does
not constitute reversible error unless it affirmatively appears that de-
1-Muscoe v. Commonwealth, 86 Va. at 447, 1o S.E. at 535; Crosswhite v. Barnes,
139 Va. at 478, 124 S.E. at 244; Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Wickline, 188 Va. 485,
489, 50 S.E.2d 387, 389 (1948).
mMuscoe v. Commonwealth, 86 Va. at 447, 10 S.E. at 535; Crosswhite v. Barnes,
139 Va. at 477, 124 S.E. at 244; Byrd v. Commonwealth, 158 Va. 897, 902, 164 S.E.
400, 402 (1932).
"-When an officer has a warrant directing an arrest he has the power to call
others to his assistance... and if the arrest be lawful the absence of a warrant is
immaterial." Byrd v. Commonwealth, 158 Va. at gol, 164 S.E. at 402. (Emphasis
added.)
-"[An officer] ... has the power to arrest without warrant one charged with a
felony .... He may also arrest without warrant where a misdemeanor is committed
in his presence." Ibid. (Emphasis added.)
2-nBourne v. Richardson, 133 Va. 441, 457, 458, 113 S.E. 893, 899 (1922); Ran-
dolph v. Commonwealth, 145 Va. at 891, 134 S.E. at 546.
InCrosswhite v. Barnes, 139 Va. at 478, 124 S.E. at 244; Randolph v. Common-
wealth, 145 Va. at 891, 134 S.E. at 546.
'-Bourne v. Richardson, 133 Va. at 458, 113 S.E. at 899.
MISection 46.1-178 relates to arrest for motor vehicle code violations.
"'Va. Code Ann. § 19.1-92 (1950).
lnDorchincoz v. Commonwealth, 191 Va. at 36, 59 S.E.2d at 864.
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fendant was prejudiced thereby."' 3 3 Furthermore, this statute gov-
erns only service of process once it actually issues; it is not determina-
tive whether, in the first instance, any process must issue before an ac-
cused may be tried,134 or even arested.
III. ARREST WITHOUT WARRANT
6. Generally.
6-1. Virginia and common law compared.
Since police officers in Virginia are vested by statute with the power
of a common law constable, 135 and Virginia follows the common law
where not repugnant to its Constitution,136 it is reasonable to conclude
that the rules of arrest without warrant are substantially those of the
common law. The leading case so declares.'
3 7
Simply stated, the rule is this: a police officer always may arrest
without warrant for an offense, of whatever nature, committed in his
presence. 38
If the officer was not present when the offense occurred, an arrest
without warrant is authorized only if it was a felony. 39 An officer
also may arrest without warrant when a felony is in progress, 40 or
is about to be committed 141
There is little modern Virginia authority on the common law
exception to the general rule, which allowed arrest without warrant for
a breach of peace, though this is but a misdemeanor. An officer's
authority to make such arrest seems settled in early cases,142 but since
igoo there is only dictum saying there might be an arrest without
warrant "when a breach of the peace is imminent.'
43
6-2. Felonies and misdemeanors defined in Virginia.
Those crimes carrying capital punishment or confinement in the
=Ibid.
"Gooch v. City of Lynchburg, 2o Va. at 175, 110 S.E.2d at 238.
3Va. Code Ann. § 15-557 (1950).
10'Va. Code Ann. § 1-1o (195o).
'IMuscoe v. Commonwealth, 86 Va. at 447, 1o S.E. at 535-
'"See Lane v. Commonwealth, 19o Va. 58, 73, 55 S.E.2d 450, 457 (1949). And
cf. Va. Code Ann. § 19.1-20 (1950).
31Muscoe v. Commonwealth, 86 Va. at 447, 1o SME. at 535; Crosswhite v. Barnes,
139 Va. at 477, 124 S.E. at 244; Williams v. Commonwealth, 142 Va. at 670, 128
S.E. at 573; Byrd v. Commonwealth, 158 Va. at goi, 164 S.E. at 402.
140Byrd v. Commonwealth, 158 Va. at 902, 164 S.E. at 402.
2l"bid.
21 2As to arrest without warrant for misdemeanors, see infra § 8.
"3 fByrd v. Commonwealth, 158 Va. at 9o2, 164 S.E. at 402.
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penitentiary are felonies; 144 other offenses are misdemeanors. 145 This
distinction remains even where the prison sentence is not manda-
tory,146 or where the court or jury, in its discretion, reduces the prison
sentence or imposes a fine in lieu of sentence to prison.
47
The applicable statute148 follows the definitions just stated.
7. Arrest without warrant: felony.
7-1. Reasonable belief a felony has been committed.
The rule of arrest without warrant for felony requires that the
officer have reasonable belief a felony has been committed. It is com-
monly phrased in terms of "reasonable suspicion"; 149 but also, "good
faith" belief,150 reasonably reliable information, 151 "reason to be-
lieve,"'152 and "reasonable grounds to believe."'
53
"Reasonable suspicion" may be based on one of the grounds noted
below.
7-1.1. Personal knowledge.
A police officer may arrest without warrant for a felony when he
has personal knowledge of the crime sufficient to create a reasonable
suspicion that the one arrested is the culprit. This authority is implic-
it in his job, and is so basic a proposition that no case law has devel-
oped in Virginia on the point.
There are, however, pertinent statutes. For example, state police
at the scene of motor vehicle accidents or in apprehending persons
charged with motor vehicle theft, may arrest without warrant "upon
reasonable grounds to believe, based upon personal investigation...
that a crime has been committed .... 1 54 Similar authority is given
sheriffs, deputies, county and city police and certain special police-
men.155
""Barker v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. (2 Va. Cas.) 122 (1817). Benton v. Common-
wealth, 89 Va. 570, 16 S.E. 725 (1893).
'Benton v. Commonwealth, supra note 144.
u1 Benton v. Commonwealth, 89 Va. at 573, i6 S.E. at 725, 726.
u 7Quillin v. Commonwealth, io5 Va. 874, 883, 54 S.E. 333, 336 (19o6).
1'"Va. Code Ann. § i8.i-6 (195o).
'"Muscoe v. Commonwealth, 86 Va. at 447, 1o S.E. at 535; Crosswhite v. Barnes,
139 Va. at 477, 124 S.E. at 244; Hendricks v. Commonwealth, 163 Va. 1102, 1108,
178 .E. 8, 11 (1935).
I-OBourne v. Richardson, 133 Va. at 45o , 113 S.E. at 896.
'mHill v. Smith, 107 Va. 848, 851, 59 S.E. 475, 476 (1907).
"Wa. Code Ann. § 4-56 (195o).
"'sVa. Code Ann § 52-20 (165o).
2"Va. Code Ann. § 19.1-100 (1950). (Emphasis added.)
"-Ibid.
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7-1.2. Knowledge a warrant has been issued.
An officer is under a legal duty to arrest one for whom a warrant
has been issued charging a felony, where the officer knows of the is-
suance of such warrant.15
7-1.3. Message from law enforcement agency.
"Members of the State Police force... may arrest, without
a warrant, persons duly charged with crime in another juris-
diction upon receipt of a telegram, a radio or teletype message,
in which ... shall be given the name or a reasonably accurate
description of such person wanted, the crime alleged and an
allegation that such person is likely to flee the jurisdiction of
the Commonwealth."'157
A similar provision covers sheriffs and deputies, county and city
police, and certain special policemen. 5 s
7-1.4. Information from a private person.
Where a private person, bleeding from a head wound, told officers
at the police station that one Fuller had assaulted him at a certain
place and that a woman might be dead there, this was held sufficient
to justify the arrest of Fuller without a warrant. 5 9
There seems to be no other authority on this point.
7-2. Belief that accused may escape if not arrested immediately.
The statute covering arrests on request of another jurisdiction
provides that a telegram, radio or teletype message to the state police
from a jurisdiction where the crime is alleged to have occurred must
contain an "allegation that such person is likely to flee the jurisdiction
of the Commonwealth."' 60 This is but a statutory condition, however,
applicable only to specific situations, and is not a part of the general
rules governing arrest without warrant for felony.
7-3. Felony committed in another state.
An arrest without warrant may lawfully be made by any private
4 Palmer v. Commonwealth, 143 Va. 592, 602, 130 S.E. 398, 401 (1925). See
also Mullins v. Saunders, 189 Va. 624, 54 S.E.2d 116 (949), as to arrest when officer
knows of issuance of out-of-state warrant.
"Va. Code Ann. § 52-20o (95o)-
'I'Va. Code Ann. § 19.1-ioo (ig5o).
'rFuller v. Commonwealth, 20ol Va. 724, 113 S.E.2d 667 (196o).
UoVa. Code Ann. § 52-20 (1950). See also Va. Code Ann. § 19.1-100 (195o), as to
arrest in similar cases by sheriffs, deputies, county and city police.
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person' 61 or peace officer acting upon "reasonable information that
the accused stands charged in the courts of a state162 with a crime pun-
ishable by death or imprisonment for a term exceeding one year."163
A message from an out-of-state law enforcement agency is sufficient
"reasonable information,"164 as is an out-of-state warrant, charging
felony, which is shown the arresting officer in this state.165
7-4- Preventing felony; halting felony in progress.
There are apparently no statutes on this point, and only one
case, but its language is unequivocal: ".... it appears that an arrest
without warrant is lawful, (i) where a felony has been committed, (2)
where it is being committed, (3) when it is about to be commit-
ted .... -166
7-5. Flight as an element.
Officers of counties, cities, and towns have authority to arrest
throughout the State, without warrant, when pursuing a fleeing fel-
on.' 67 While there is no directly applicable statute, state police pre-
sumably have similar authority.
8. Arrest without warrant: misdemeanor.
8-1. Generally.
Except for a breach of peace, the common law did not allow an
arrest without warrant for misdemeanors unless the offense was com-
mitted in the officer's presence. 16s Virginia follows the common law
here,169 even to the exception about breaches of the peace, although
there is not much authority on this latter point.170
"It is the duty of a police officer to make an arrest, without a war-
rant, for a misdemeanor committed in his presence,"'' and the cases
are numerous holding that such an arrest is a lawful exercise of the
"'As to arrest without warrant by private persons, see § 9 infra.
"'resumably this means a state other than Virginia.
1mVa. Code Ann. § 19.1-64 (1950). See also Williams v. Commonwealth, 142 Va.
at 672, 128 S.E. at 574.
1"Va. Code Ann. § 52-20, 19.1-100 (195o).
u-iMullins v. Saunders, supra note 156.
39'Byrd v. Commonwealth, 158 Va. at 902, 164 S.E. at 402.
10"Va. Code Ann. § 19.1-94 (195o).
'"Muscoe v. Commonwealth, 86 Va. at 447, 1o S.E. at 535.
'O'Ibid.
27OSee supra note 143.
7' Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Haun, 167 Va. at 164, 187 S.E. at 484.
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officer's authority.172 Equally ample is the authority that no arrest
without warrant may be made for a misdemeanor not committed in
the officer's presence.173
There are particular situations where certain persons have sta-
tutory authority to arrest without warrant: (i) certain conservators
of the peace, for any misdemeanor committed in their presence; 174
(-) any officer of any county, city or town, in an adjoining county,
city or town, in close pursuit of one who has committed a misdemean-
or in his presence and jurisdiction; 1 75 (3) probation and parole of-
ficers, parolees for violations of their parole;' 7 6 (4) officers and agents of
societies for prevention of cruelty to animals, any person violating in
their presence the laws concerning cruelty to animals; 77 (5) members
of the Commission of Fisheries and certain other persons, for viola-
tions of the fish and shellfish laws;' 78 (6) any person authorized to make
arrests, persons disturbing an election; 179 (7) judges of election, may
order the arrest of any person intimidating voters at an election;8 0 and
(8) a conservator of the peace, any person carrying a dangerous weap-
on to a place of worship on Sunday.'s'
Not only does an officer lack authority to arrest without warrant
for a misdemeanor not committed in his presence, but such arrest is
unlawful, constitutes false imprisonment, 182 and may be resisted by
one sought to be taken into custody.183 The right to resist such an
unlawful arrest does not, however, include the right to kill the arrest-
ing officer unless the arrestee's own life is in danger. 8 4
One important statutory exception has been engrafted upon the
general common law rule prohibiting arrests without warrants for mis-
111Muscoe v. Commonwealth, supra note 2; Crosswhite v. Barnes, supra note
107; Byrd v. Commonwealth, supra note 124. See also Montgomery Ward & Co. v.
Wickline, supra note 123, holding invalid an arrest without warrant for a misde-
meanor not committed in the officer's presence.
*"aMuscoe v. Commonwealth, 86 Va. at 447, so S.E. at 535; Bourne v. Richard-
son, 133 Va. at 45o , i13 S.E. at 896; Crosswhite v. Barnes, 139 Va. at 478, 124 S.E.
at 244; Williams v. Commonwealth, 142 Va. at 671, 128 S.E. at 574; Montgomery
Ward & Co. v. Wickline, 188 Va. at 489, 50 S.E.2d at 389.
1 'Va. Code Ann. § 19.1-2o (ig5o).
',Va. Code Ann. § 19.1-94 (1950).
1
-Wa. Code Ann. § 53-259( 1950).
17"',Ta. Code Ann. § 18.1-217 (1950).
2"1a. Code Ann. § 28.1-185 (195o).
',Va. Code Ann. § 24-192 (1950).
X9Va. Code Ann. § 24-190 (1950).
2'Va. Code Ann. § 18.1-241 (1950).
'3Iontgomery Ward & Co. v. Wickline, 188 Va. at 489, 50 S.E.2d at 389.
'Briggs v. Commonwealth, 82 Va. 554, 564 (1886).
""Ibid. See also McReynolds v. Commonwealth, 177 Va. 933, 15 S.E.2d 70 (1941).
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demeanors not committed in the officer's presence. State Police, sheriffs,
deputies, city and county police, and certain special policemen may ar-
rest, without warrant, under authority of a message received from a law
enforcement agency, even for misdemeanor. 8 5
8-2. Breach of the peace.
At common law, a breach of the peace was the only non-felony
for which an arrest could be made without warrant when the offense
did not occur in the officer's presence.
One Virginia case' 86 says an officer may arrest without warrant
"where a breach of the peace is imminent." Except for this, which is
dictum since the case involved a felony, there is no case authority on
the point. And so, one can only say that Virginia follows the common
law on arrest, 87 except as changed by the Constitution. 8 8 An early fed-
eral circuit court case in Virginia said of the common law: "'[O]ffi-
cers... have, at common law, the right to arrest without warrant all
persons who are guilty of a breach of the peace .......,,-89 it held that this
arrest rule does not violate the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment.
The Supreme Court of Appeals has said this of a breach of the
peace:
"By 'peace'... is meant the tranquillity enjoyed by the
citizens of a municipality or community where good order
reigns among its members. It is the natural right of all persons
in a political society, and any intentional violation of that right
is a 'breach of the peace.' It is the offense of disturbing the pub-
lic peace, or a violation of public order or public decorum.
Actual personal violence is not an essential element of the of-
fense."190
Drunkenness is generally held a breach of the peace within the mean-
ing of rules relating to arrest.191
While law officers retain the common law authority to arrest with-
out warrant for past breaches of the peace, certain conservators of the
"-Va. Code Ann. §§ 52-20, i9.1-ioo (ig5o). See also Va. Code Ann. § 52-22 (1950).
See also § 7-1.3 supra.
116Byrd v. Commonwealth, 158 Va. at 902, 164 S.E. at 402.
1 TMuscoe v. Commonwealth, 86 Va. at 447, 1o S.E. at 535; Galliher v. Com-
monwealth, 161 Va. at 1021, 170 S.E. at 736.
'8'Va. Code Ann. § i-1O (195o).
'Cox v. Gilmer, 4 Va. L. Reg. 229, 235, 88 Fed. 43, 249 (1898)-
'"Byrd v. Commonwealth, 158 Va. at 903, 164 S.F. at 402-.
"'Galliher v. Commonwealth, 161 Va. at 1022, 170 S.E. at 736.
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peace also have authority to arrest for such offenses, but the language
of the applicable statutes seems to indicate the crime must occur in
their presence.
19 2
8-3. What is the officer's presence.
"An offense is committed within the presence of an officer... when
he has direct personal knowledge, through his sight, hearing, or other
senses that it is then and there being committed."'' 93
"The law is not so unreasonable as to require the officer to
be an eye or ear witness of what passes, and to render all his
authority null and void, except when he is so present."'
' 94
8-4. Other factors.
There are other considerations regarding arrest without warrant,
such as whether there is a time limitation (after the offense) on arrest-
ing without warrant for felony, or whether an arrest without warrant
may be made in a private home, and if so, under what circumstances.
Since, however, these matters have not been dealt with in Virginia
by either case or statute, it is assumed they are governed by the com-
mon law as generally understood. 195
9. Arrest without warrant: by private persons.
Language in the cases is suggestive of the common law rule that a
private person may arrest for crimes, be they felonies or misdemeanors,
committed in his presence, but never is there an unequivocal state-
ment that this is the law. It may, however, be assumed so, since the
law of arrest in Virginia follows, for the most part, the common law. 96
As to felonies, the following comes closest to an explicit statement
of the common law rule:
"... to prevent the consummation of this felony any officer had
the right to arrest him with or without a warrant, and any pri-
vate citizen had that right whether to aid an officer or not."'
97
'-See, e.g., Va. Code Ann. §§ 18.1-247, 19.1-20 (i5o). The former allows judges
and justices of the peace to order arrest of persons engaged in riots, routs and un-
lawful assemblies. The latter provides that certain conservators of the peace shall
arrest for breaches of the peace committed in their presence.
uOGalliher v. Commonwealth, 161 Va. at 1021, 170 S.E. at 736.
"Byrd v. Commonwealth, 158 Va. at 9O2, 164 S.E. at 402.
1 See supra notes 2, 187, 188.
O.'fuscoe v. Commonwealth, 86 Va. at 447, 1o S.E. at 535; Va. Code Ann. §
1-10 vt956)a'"Byrd v. Commonwealth, 158 Va. at 9o3, 164 S.E. at 402. (Emphasis added.)
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In another case,198 it is said a private person may arrest, if a felony
has been committed and there are reasonable grounds of suspicion,
presumably meaning suspicion that the one sought to be arrested is
the felon.
As to misdemeanors, it is said:
"But, in general, in cases of misdemeanor, a constable or
other peace officer cannot, any more than a private person,
justify the arrest of the offender without warrant when the
offense was not committed in his presence."' 99
As to breaches of the peace, a treatise asserts200 that a private
citizen may arrest without warrant for a breach of the peace commit-
ted in his presence; but the case cited in support is a federal case, from
Virginia, and there seems to be no state decision on the point.
Of course a private person may arrest under authority of a war-
rant when he has been deputized for that purpose.
201
IV. MAKING THE ARREST
2 0 2
io. Use of force.
io-i. General rule.
In determining the degree of force an officer may lawfully use in an
arrest, a rule of "reasonableness" applies. What is reasonable will,
of course, vary with the circumstances. For example, an officer who
shoots and wounds one engaging in "riotous and disorderly conduct"
and resisting arrest has been held to have used only "necessary" force,
and therefore not to have been guilty of assault and battery.203
This general rule logically precludes use of any but nominal force
where the accused submits voluntarily. The problems arise when there
is resistance, requiring some actual physical force to effect the arrest.
Resistance obviously affects the degree of force permissible.
Meeting resistance, an officer has not only the right of self-defense,
but also a "special protection" of the law under which he may press
forward to accomplish the arrest, since he must of necessity be the
aggressor.2 04 Still however, the use of excessive force makes him a
3 Hill v. Smith, 107 Va. at 851, 59 S.E. at 476.
lnMuscoe v. Commonwealth, 86 Va. at 447, 1o S.E. at 535. (Emphasis added.)
102 Michie's Jurisprudence: Virginia and West Virginia 91 (1948).
2iRandolph v. Commonwealth, 145 Va. at 891, 134 S.E. at 546.
02See also supra §§ 5-3 ("Possession of warrant at time of arrest") and 5-4
("Informing accused").
Mesmer v. Commonwealth, 67 Va. (26 Gratt.) 976 (1875).
2NMercer v. Commonwealth, i5o Va. 588, 6oo, 142 S.E. 369, 372 (1928).
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wrongdoer,2003 and the arrestee may resist, though he may not resist
to the point of killing the officer unless his own life be in danger.206
And such killing will not be murder if the arrestee was without fault
in provoking the affray.20 7
Should the officer meet force with force and one party be killed,
the culpability of the slayer is governed, again, by a rule of reasonable-
ness. One resisting a wrongful arrest, if himself without fault,208 may
kill the officer if necessar-y to save his own life.2° 9
Conversely, an officer may kill a fleeing felon, if, "within reasonable
limits the necessity for homicide" appear,210 and there is no other
way of effecting the arrest.21' Absent these conditions, the officer may
be liable for some grade of criminal homicide.212
The arresting officer is, of course, the judge of how much force is
reasonable. 213 Where in issue at trial, this is for the jury,214 and
"courts... will recognize the fact that emergencies arise when... [of-
ficers] are not expected to exercise that cool and deliberate judgment
which courts and juries exercise afterwards upon investigations in
courts."2 15 "The utmost good judgment is not to be expected at all
times from [officers] .... ,2 16 "Frequently ... [an officer] has little time
for deliberation, and must use his best judgment, under the circum-
stances, as reasonably appear to him.12 1 7
As an arresting officer is presumed to act lawfully,21 8 the burden of
justifying resistance is upon one who resists. 2 19
10-2. Resistance.
Resistance by an arrestee is a major determinant as to how much
mPalmer v. Commonwealth, 143 Va. at 602, 603, 13o S.E. at 401.
2Palmer v. Commonwealth, 143 Va. at 602, 13o S.E. at 4o1; Briggs v. Com-
monwealth 82 Va. at 564.
O"Looney v. Commonwealth, 15 Va. 921, 931, 78 S.E. 625, 628 (1913); Palmer
v. Commonwealth 143 Va. at 6o3, 13o S.E. at 401.
DIbid.
'Palmer v. Commonwealth, 143 Va. 6o2, 603, io S.E. at 401.
2lHendricks v. Commonwealth, 163 Va. at 11o8, 178 S.E. at ii.
2Hendricks v. Commonwealth, 163 Va. at 11o 9 , 178 S.E. at ii.
''See, e.g., McReynolds v. Commonwealth, supra note 184.
mDavidson v. Allam, 143 Va. 367, 373, 13o S.E. 245, 246 (1925).
=6143 at 372, 13o S.E. at 246; Hendricks v. Commonwealth, 163 Va. at i1o8,
1109, 178 S.E. at ii. See also Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Haun, supra note 38.
21-Davidson v. Allam, 143 Va. at 373, 130 S.E. at 246.
"O1 Hendricks v. Commonwealth, 163 Va. at 11o8, 178 S.E. at i1.
"Lane v. Commonwealth, i9o Va. at 73, 55 S.F..2d at 457.
2Looney v. Commonwealth, 115 Va. at 931, 78 S.E. at 628; Mercer v. Common-
wealth, 15o Va. at 596, 142 S.E. at 371.
""Looney v. Commonwealth, 115 Va. at 931, 78 S.E. at 628.
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force is reasonable under the circumstances. Whether the accused's al-
leged offense be felony or misdemeanor is only one relevant circum-
stance.
"Where an accused strikes the officer before the officer strikes
him or uses any unnecessary force against him, he is guilty of
resisting arrest; and the fact that the officer subsequently uses
more force than is necessary and does the accused unnecessary
bodily harm in effecting his arrest does not exculpate the ac-
cused from the offense of resisting the officer. This is true even
though the officer may have subsequently used so much more
force than was necessary that he committed a crime in so doing
which is deserving of a much severer punishment than that
committed by the accused in resisting the arrest."220
One may resist an unlawful arrest221 "with such reasonable force
as... [is] necessary to repel that being exercised by the officer in his
unwarranted undertaking."222 Resistance has been held justified also
when the accused was not shown any warrant or informed of the
charges against him.
223
Just as an officer may use only reasonable force to effect an arrest,
one lawfully resisting an arrest, for whatever reason, may use only
"such.. . force as [is] ... necessary to repel that being exercised by
the officer,"2 24 i.e., reasonable force. He may kill the officer but only
if his own life is in danger and if he himself is blameless in provoking
the violence.225
Absent malice, such killing is only manslaughter, 220 but where
malicious and deliberate, the killing is murder even though the at-
tempted arrest was not lawful.227 The rule is that "in cases of homicide
a defendant who has been illegally arrested may successfully interpose
that defense [of illegal arrest] only when he acts in hot blood induced
by the indignity which has been offered him."
225
2-°Galliher v. Commonwealth, 161 Va. at 1020, 170 S.E. at 736.
2Briggs v. Commonwealth, 82 Va. at 564; Muscoe v. Commonwealth, 86 Va. at
448, 1o S.E. at 535.
2Banks v. Bradley, 192 Va. 598, 6o3, 66 S.E.2d 526, 529 (1951).
-"Bourne v. Richardson, supra note 127. As to informing accused, see supra
§ 5-4.
224Banks v. Bradley, 192 Va. at 603, 66 S.E.2d at 529.
-2Briggs v. Commonwealth, 82 Va. at 564; Looney v. Commonwealth, 115 Va. at
931, 78 S.E. at 628; Banks v. Bradley, 192 Va. at 604, 66 S.E.2d at 529, 530. See
also Clinton v. Commonwealth, 161 Va. 1084, 172 S.E. 272 (1934).
-NMuscoe v. Commonwealth, 86 Va. at 448, 1o S.E. at 536.
-22Clinton v. Commonwealth, 161 Va. at 1094, 172 S.E. at 275.
=i6i Va. at io93, 172 S.E. at 275. See also Banks v. Bradley, 192 Va. at 604, 66
S.E.2d at 529, 530.
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An officer encountering resistance may use reasonable force to pro-
tect himself,229 but since he must be the aggressor and press forward to
effect the arrest he also has a special protection,23 0 still limited how-
ever, by the rule of reasonableness. "[When] ... extreme measures are
resorted to in making arrests, it must appear that such measures were
necessary, and that the felon could not otherwise be taken."
231
Under the general rule, an officer whose life was endangered by
the resistance of an alleged misdemeanor probably could slay the
arrestee in self-defense. 23 2 Only extreme circumstances, however, per-
mit such action, whether the offense be felony or misdemeanor.
"The law does not clothe an officer with the authority to
judge arbitrarily of the necessity of killing a person to secure
him.... He cannot kill unless there is a necessity for it, and the
jury must determine upon the testimony the existence or ab-
sence of the necessity. They must judge of the reasonableness




Flight is not resistance to arrest, but avoidance thereof.23 5
lo-3.1. Minor felony or misdemeanor.
The grade of the offense is a factor in determining how much
force is reasonable, since "'extreme measures ... which might be re-
sorted to in capital felonies, would shock us if resorted to in inferior
felonies.' "236 A fortiori, the same rule would apply to misdemeanors.
It is said that "officers have no right to inflict serious bodily harm
upon one who is simply fleeing arrest for a misdemeanor."
23 7
An early secondary authority states:
"While an officer may have a right under certain circum-
stances to kill a felon in order to prevent his escape, or in mak-
2Lane v. Commonwealth, i9o Va. at 73, 55 S.E.2d at 457.
m°Mercer v. Commonwealth, i5o Va. at 599, 142 S.E. at 372.
='Hendricks v. Commonwealth, 163 Va. at 111o, 178 S.E. at 11.
=See Mercer v. Commonwealth, 150 Va. at 599, 6oo, 142 S.E. at 371, 372.
=2Hendricks v. Commonwealth, 163 Va. at 11o 9, 178 S.E. at 11.
2WVhile the force which may be used in making arrests is governed by the rule
of reason, some cases, in applying the rule, have distinguished the situation of
flight from that of resistance only. Practically, however, whether the accused sub-
mits, or resists, or flees, or resists and flees, the officer still may use only force
reasonable under the circumstances. Distinguishing these situations, therefore, seems
academic. Nevertheless, the distinction is found in cases, so is retained here.
-Jones v. Commonwealth, 141 Va. 471, 478, 126 S.E. 74, 76, 77 (1925).
m1rHendricks v. Commonwealth, 163 Va. at iiog, 1110, 178 S.E. at 11.
2Crosswhite v. Barnes, 139 Va. at 480, 124 S.E. at 245.
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ing an arrest, there is absolutely no question that the officer
has no right to wound or shoot a man, for whom he even has
a warrant, for a misdemeanor unless the man uses violence in
resisting arrest; but the mere fact that he flees to avoid arrest
does not give the officer any right whatever to shoot at him,
much less to wound or kill him. Neither a private citizen nor an
officer attempting to arrest one guilty of misdemeanor, is justi-
fied in killing the alleged offender merely to effect the arrest,
whether the offender be fleeing to avoid arrest or to escape
from custody." 238
10-3.2. Major felony.
An officer has a duty to pursue a fleeing suspected felon "and use
whatever force... [is] reasonably necessary to apprehend him."239
Thus an officer may slay the arrestee in such a situation, but only if
there be necessity for it, since "'in any case where extreme measures
are resorted to in making arrests, it must appear that they were neces-
sary, and that the felon could not be otherwise taken.'"240 And the
jury241 will determine the existence of such necessity. 242
1o-4. Determining whether force is reasonable or excessive.
"Officers, within reasonable limits, are the judges of the
force necessary to enable them to make arrests.... When acting
in good faith, the courts will afford them the utmost protec-
tion, and they will recognize the fact that emergencies arise
when they are not expected to exercise that cool and delib-
erate judgment which courts and juries exercise afterwards
upon investigations in court. '243
Even further, an arresting officer is presumed to act lawfully, i.e.,
to have used reasonable force. Thus, "the burden rests upon the ac-
cused, who undertakes to resist the arrest, to show that the officer's
conduct was such as to justify such resistance." 244 Where in issue, it is
a jury question whether force used was reasonable.245
On these matters, the cases are plain. There seems confusion, how-
ever, whether the necessity for force, of whatever degree, need be
actual or apparent. In a leading case both these statements appear on
2'4 Va. L. Reg. (Ns.) 624 (1918). (Emphasis added.)
mBerry v. Hamman, 203 Va. 596, 599, 125 S.E.2d 851, 854 (1962).
mHendricks v. Commonwealth, 163 Va. at 111o, 178 S.E. at ii.
2 "Davidson v. Allam, 143 Va. at 372, 13o S.E. at 246.
2Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Haun, 167 Va. at 164, 187 S.E. 484.
=Davidson v. Allam, 143 Va. at 373, 13o S.E. at 246.
2"Looney v. Commonwealth, 115 Va. at 931, 78 S.E. at 628. See also § 10-4 supra.
m5Davidson v. Allam, 143 Va. 372, 373, 13o S.E. at 246.
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the same page: (1) "where extreme measures are resorted to in making
arrests, it must appear that they were necessary, and that the felon
could not be otherwise taken."; (2) "[An arresting officer] .. cannot
kill, except in cases of actual necessity....246
10-5. Other considerations.
There are other factors which also may influence the permissible
degree of force: Whether the accused resists and flees; whether, being
already in custody, he attempts escape; whether the officer is attempt-
ing to arrest to prevent crime. On these situations, and others which
might be conceived, there is no Virginia authority.
ii. Summoning assistance.
"An officer attempting to execute a lawful warrant may, in
case of resistance made or apprehended, summon so many of
the people of his county, or corporation, or require the com-
mandant of any regiment therein to call out such portion
of his regiment to aid him, as may be sufficient. '247
The "his county" provision of this statute has been construed
as directory, not mandatory, so that the officer may command assistance
from persons of a county other than his own.2 48 And they are not
trespassers, nor does their assistance invalidate the arrest.
249
Similar authority to summon assistance is specially given to of-
ficers acting under extradition warrants. 250
WILLIAM T. BRAIrHWArrE*
UOHendricks v. Commonwealth, 136 Va. at 111o, 178 S.E. at xi. (Emphasis
added.)
'A'Va. Code Ann. § 15-514 (1950).
2Dellastatious v. Boyce, 152 Va. 368, 147 S.E. 267 (1929).
vAlbid.
--,Va. Code Ann. §§ 19.1-57, 19.1-58 (1950).
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